

# **DOES CANDIDATE PARTY AFFILIATION AFFECT TURNOUT?**

## **Evidence from a randomised field experiment in a low-information election.**

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### **Abstract**

Candidates' party affiliations are usually seen as heuristics that help individuals overcome the costs of voting and therefore increase turnout. However, the effects of party affiliation on voter mobilization are difficult to evaluate because candidates who belong to political parties differ on many accounts from candidates who are running as Independents. Moreover, rational choice models of how candidates' party affiliations reduce voting costs have rarely integrated well-known findings about the conditioning role of voters' own partisanship. To overcome the problem of causal inference and to integrate theories of party affiliation and partisanship, we conducted a randomised field experiment in cooperation with a UK Labour Party in an election where almost no information about candidates was available to Labour partisans and to those supporting rival parties. We vary whether a GOTV call mentions the candidate's party affiliation and find that calls that explicitly portray a candidate as Labour, mobilize Labour supporters at higher rates than individuals who support rival parties. Mentioning party affiliation in a GOTV message leads to lower turnout among rival party supporters who are less engaged in politics.

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Acquiring information about an election, the candidates running for office and their political platforms is often seen as a major cost associated with electoral participation (Downs 1957; Aldrich 1995; Schaffner et al. 2001). According to the rational choice school of political behavior, the turnout decision is related to candidate choice (Downs 1957: 36-46). Since individuals have no incentive to actively seek information about candidates, they are unlikely to vote (Downs 1957; Snyder and Ting 2002). By providing a “brand name” that serves as an information cue about candidates and their positions, political parties are seen as a major source to overcome this information problem, lowering voting costs and increasing turnout (Aldrich 1995, 2006; Snyder and Ting 2002; Schaffner et al. 2001; Schaffner and Streb 2002). Moreover, candidates’ party affiliations provide individuals with “teams to root (and to vote) for in contests that otherwise--because of the costs of information--most voters would have a hard time getting excited about” (Schaffner et al. 2001: 9). Party labels therefore turn a contest between two relatively unknown candidates into a broader contest of parties that relate to longstanding affective attachments in the electorate (Aldrich 1995). Although evidence from laboratory, survey and field experiments suggests that party cues help individuals infer relevant information about candidates (Conover 1981, Druckman 2001; Arceneaux 2007; Schaffner and Streb 2001; Arceneaux and Kolodny 2009), these results do not imply that more information necessarily translates into higher turnout. Political psychologists have long insisted that partisan predispositions condition whether individuals accept information that is associated with a rival party (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992), or whether they would even act on this information in case they accepted it to be valid (Hirschman 1971; Fiorina 1976; Mutz 2006). However, these established findings about the conditioning influence of voters’ party loyalties have not been integrated with theories about the effects of party labels on individuals’ turnout decisions. The

expectation that partisans will respond differently once information is associated with a specific political party is supported by recent evidence based on survey experiments about blame and responsibility attribution in economic voting (Malhotra and Magalit 2010; Tilley and Hobolt 2011). In contrast to the rational choice claim that additional information contained in party labels will lower decision costs for everybody, information associated with a political party might activate rival party loyalties within the electorate and hence lead political behavior to diverge based on partisan predispositions.

The problem of identifying the effects of a candidate's party affiliation on turnout in observational studies is related to the fact that candidates who belong to political parties differ on many observable and unobservable accounts from candidates who are running as Independents: they have unequal amounts of financial resources, unequal number of campaign volunteers, and different personal histories and political programmes. Although experimental studies have the potential to overcome this problem by randomly allocating subjects to treatment and control groups, it is difficult to randomly assign a candidate's party affiliation – or individual's knowledge of a candidate's party affiliation -- in a real world election as candidates are normally well-known. Choosing a lab experiment instead, however, would have the drawback that we would have to infer how subjects would behave in a real-world election from the responses gathered during a mock election in the lab, which is likely to affect the external validity of the results. We therefore chose to run a randomised field experiment in a new election, the first-ever Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) election in the United Kingdom, co-operating with a local Labour Party in Birmingham, ensuring that none of the candidates were incumbents and increasing the chance that subjects had no knowledge about the candidates before our intervention. The widely reported fact that there had never been a nation-wide election in post

war Britain, where there was so little free information available about candidates (Garland and Terry 2012), contributes to making this election an ideal case for testing the effects of providing information about a candidate's party affiliation on turnout in a randomised field experiment.

The three-armed experimental design of the study guarantees that, in expectation, there are no observable or unobservable differences between those individuals who are assigned to be contacted with a GOTV message emphasising a candidate's party affiliation, those individuals who are assigned to be contacted with a similar message that avoids party labels, and those individuals assigned to the control group. We find that phone calls by party volunteers that associated the candidate explicitly with the Labour Party failed to increase turnout among individuals who were known to support rival parties, although the same calling script substantially increased turnout among Labour supporters and unattached voters. Moreover, similar phone calls that avoided any mention of the candidate's party affiliation mobilized supporters of rival parties at a similar rate as Labour partisans. These results indicate that partisan labels do not always reduce information costs because information is simply rejected if it is associated with a party the individual does not support. Before elaborating on the design of the experiment and presenting the results, we will first discuss the existing literature on the role of a candidate's party in mobilizing voters and formulate our hypotheses.

### **The Role of the Candidate's Party in Mobilizing Voters**

To address the problem that independent candidates are not comparable to party candidates, researchers have studied local elections in which candidates are banned from displaying any kind of party affiliation and compared them to similar local elections in which parties are allowed to participate. Such studies tend to find that turnout is lower in nonpartisan contests (Alford and

Lee 1968; Karnig and Walter 1983; Schaffner et al. 2001; Holbrook and Kaufmann 2012). However, elections in which political parties participate differ in more than one aspect from elections in which candidates run without party affiliation. Aldrich (1995: 50) emphasizes for instance that on top of a “brand name”, candidates receive access to a party’s machinery that can be used to mobilize the electorate by knocking on doors, making phone calls and distributing leaflets. As Schaffner et al. (2001: 19) admit, studies that compare partisan and nonpartisan elections have problems accounting for these confounding factors: “the small N here means that we cannot control for competitiveness, campaign intensity or any of the plethora of variables that are associated with turnout differences”.

Although randomised field experiments would be capable of dealing with the problem of confounding between a candidate’s party affiliation and other factors in a party’s electoral campaign, the role of the party in voter mobilization efforts has largely eluded experimental testing. The overwhelming majority of GOTV experiments in the United States, as well as the small number of randomised field experiments in the United Kingdom (John and Brannan 2008; Cutts et al. 2009; Fieldhouse et al. 2003; 2012), have been conducted to date by researchers and non-partisan organisations. Field experiments that have been conducted in co-operation with political parties are rare (Gerber 2004; McNulty 2005; Nickerson et al. 2006; Panagopoulos 2009) and have not distinguished the effects of using the party brand label from the effects of voter contact and candidate advocacy.

In addition to this lack of attention paid to the role of the party, little attention has also been paid to the role of voters’ different partisan attachments. Both the partisan GOTV literature (Nickerson 2005) and the rational choice literature on party affiliation (Aldrich 1995; Schaffner et al. 2001) has argued that some voters hold longstanding party preferences that exert an

influence on how individuals perceive their environment and how they behave in elections (Campbell et al 2006; Green et al. 2002; Bartle and Belucci 2009). The field experimental literature on partisan mobilization (Gerber 2004; McNulty 2005; Nickerson et al. 2006; Panagopoulos 2009) has not paid sufficient attention to this fact or to the problem that parties often do not have complete information on individual party preferences. This lack of complete information is certainly a problem in the majority of countries such as in the United Kingdom, where individuals do not officially register their partisanship to vote in primaries. Even if political parties try to focus their mobilization efforts on individuals who support them, unavailable or incomplete information on partisanship can lead to a situation in which supporters of rival parties are contacted by mistake. Moreover, campaigns sometimes decide to attempt to convert unattached voters and those who have not voted for them in the past because they compete in constituencies in which they do not hold an inbuilt partisan advantage (Johnston and Pattie 2003; Nickerson et al. 2006). Although Nickerson et al. (2005; 2006) target for instance voters who are thought to be Democrats in order to mobilize them to turn out to vote, a post-treatment survey shows that most individuals in their sample self-identified as Republicans. This example is neither exceptional, nor trivial. If, in line with the rational choice literature on political parties, partisan affiliation cuts information costs for all individuals, we would expect partisans to be more likely to vote once they are contacted with information by a party they do not support. Although some studies have found persuasion effects using partisan direct mail (Gerber 2004; Gerber et al. 2011; Rodgers and Middleton 2012), no such effects on vote switching have yet been reported in partisan telephone campaigns (Cardy 2005; Green and Gerber 2008). Hence, there is the possibility that a mobilization drive could “backfire” because the campaign mobilizes voters who are unlikely to support the party who initiates contact

(Sanders and Norris 2005; Arcenaux and Kolodny 2009). However, if partisanship works like a “perceptual screen” (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992), supporters of rival parties might be ready to simply dismiss information that is associated with a party they do not support. Moreover, even if they accept information that conflicts with their partisanship, this information might fail to translate into higher turnout since internal ambiguity between partisan loyalty and information attached to a rival party might lead to internal “cross-pressure” and, therefore, increase an individual’s costs of voting (Hirschman 1971; Fiorina 1976; Mutz 2006).

Based on the preceding discussion, we derive competing hypotheses about how individuals who receive a voter mobilization message in favor of a candidate who can be identified with a rival party may act. Following the rational choice literature on the heuristic benefits of partisan affiliation, we would expect all individuals who are contacted with a message containing information about a candidate’s party affiliation to be mobilized at higher rates than individuals who are contacted with a GOTV message that does not mention the party affiliation of the candidate (*Hypothesis 1 – Cost Reduction Hypothesis*). Moreover, all subjects should be mobilized at similar rates, no matter their own partisanship (*Hypothesis 2 – Symmetric Mobilization Hypothesis*). In contrast, if providing individuals with the party affiliation of a candidate works to screen out messages that jar an individual’s partisanship, we would expect partisans who are contacted with a message mentioning a candidate’s association with a rival party to be less likely to vote than individuals who support the party that initiates contact (*Hypothesis 3 – Asymmetric Mobilization Hypothesis*). Furthermore, we should expect a significant, negative effect of mentioning a candidate’s party association on turnout among rival party supporters who are subject to a GOTV drive (*Hypothesis 4 – Partisan Conditioning Hypothesis*).

## **Research Design**

Isolating the effect of associating a candidate with a political party from voter contact in general poses multiple challenges. First, we addressed the challenge of excludability by designing a three-armed experiment that allows us to distinguish the effect on turnout of a GOTV message that included from one that excluded references to the candidate's party affiliation. In a high salience election, however, it would have nonetheless been likely that many voters would know the candidates and their affiliation, given extensive media coverage, normal campaign activity and the distribution of free electoral materials. We addressed this second problem by working in a election that had never been held before. The Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) election on November 15th 2012 was the first of its kind in England and Wales, and very little information was available to voters about the election, the candidates and their party affiliation. As the Electoral Reform Society concludes in its report on the election "Voters were then left in the dark about who they could vote for with a lack of centrally provided candidate information" (Garland and Terry 2012: 7). In fact, the government failed to provide funds to the Electoral Commission to distribute leaflets with information about candidates to eligible households (Garland and Terry 2012: 10). To make matters worse, since the position of Police and Crime Commissioner was newly established, none of the candidates were incumbents with high name recognition. Moreover, none of the candidates in the West Midlands PCC election had served in national office before and the sheer size of the West Midlands Constituency, which spans 902 km<sup>2</sup> and includes 2.7 million people, contributed to the fact that candidates were unknown to the general public. In order to receive information, potential voters had to actively search the Internet or request a leaflet from the Electoral Commission. The low information context of the election therefore both increased the probability that candidates were unknown to the electorate



and serves as a strong test of the Cost Reduction Hypothesis. If a candidate's party affiliation does not reduce voting costs in a low information environment, it probably also fails to do so in an election, where information about candidates is abundant.

Finally, to test the hypothesized differential effect of the messages depending on individuals' partisan predisposition, we created blocks using an important pre-treatment covariate: a measure of party attachment as recorded during previous Labour canvassing efforts. Grouping subjects into three different partisan categories based on pre-treatment information allows us to test our hypotheses by estimating the effects of the treatment separately for each partisan category.

### ***Study Population***

Our study population comprises those individuals living in a select number of electoral wards in Birmingham, and whose names were included in the Labour Campaign's electoral database, a total of 26,827 individuals. This database had been most recently updated after the May 3, 2012 local elections. Only individuals registered to vote are included in the database. We used an anonymised version of the database to randomly select individuals into treatment and control groups.<sup>2</sup> To avoid individuals living in the same household receiving the treatment multiple times – the so-called problem of interference – we randomly selected one person per household to be included in the sample. After excluding additional household members our sample consists of 15,461 individuals.

In addition to information on whether individuals share the same household and their contact details, the database includes information on gender ('Mr' or 'Ms'), date of birth,

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<sup>2</sup> All names and contact details were removed and replaced by a unique identifier code for each person by the Labour campaign.

whether individuals were registered as postal voters, as well as individuals' latest recorded party attachment and their voting history (as recorded during previous Labour campaigns).

### *Experimental Assignment*

In order to randomise individuals in our sample into treatment and control groups, we first stratified the sample of 15,461 individuals into three groups (or blocks):

1. Those for which the database included a landline phone number only: 13,065 individuals
2. Those for which the database included a mobile phone number only: 1,531 individuals
3. Those for which the database included both a landline and a mobile phone number: 874 individuals

The first group was distinguished from the latter two in order to test the effectiveness of both volunteer phone calls as well as text messages. As we found no effects of the GOTV text messages on turnout at all for any partisan group, we focus on the results for the phone experiment because we think there are good reasons to believe that the null effects produced by the text message treatment were rather due to the medium than to the message.<sup>3</sup> For the design and results of the text message experiment we refer the reader to the Online Appendix.

In order to test whether our treatments had a different effect for Labour supporters than for non-Labour supporters, we further stratified each of the three groups in the sample ('landline', 'mobile', and 'both') into those whose latest recorded partisanship in the database was 'Labour', those whose latest recorded partisanship was a (specified) 'other party' (i.e. Conservative, Liberal Democrat, Green, BNP, Respect, UK Independence Party, or who indicated to have voted for an independent candidate or against Labour), and those whose latest

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<sup>3</sup> It was for instance impossible to verify if subjects had read the text message.

recorded partisanship was ‘unknown’ or who self-identified as non-partisans or non-voters (i.e. ‘won’t say’, ‘don’t know’, ‘non-voter’ or missing).

To get a sense of whether the Labour Party measure of partisanship is a good predictor of vote choice, we instructed volunteers delivering the message with references to the candidate’s party to ask at the end of the script which party an individual would vote for in a General Election. Records show that among those who answered this question (the response rate was 62%), 77% of subjects in the Labour group said that they would vote Labour in a General Election, while only 27% in the grouping of other partisans and 33% of unknown partisans made such a statement. Callers were entirely blind to a subject’s pre-treatment partisanship. These figures confirm that although the Labour Party’s information about whether individuals support the party might be incomplete, it is valid, since voters who are labelled as Labour supporters are 3-4 times as likely to declare that they would vote for the Labour Party than those whose are seen as unattached or as supporting other parties.<sup>4</sup>

In the final step, individuals in each of the three partisan groups of the ‘landline’ group were randomly allocated into three more groups: two treatment groups and one control group. The size of both treatment groups was equal, but limited compared to the size of the control group by the expected capacity of party volunteers to contact individuals. Individuals in the first treatment group received a baseline message that did not include a party label, while individual in the second treatment group received a similar message that attached the candidate to a particular party. The final allocation of individuals into treatment and control groups – including those in the text message experiment -- is shown in Figure 1.

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<sup>4</sup> From speaking to organisers and volunteers, we believe that the database we worked with was of very high quality compared to similar data bases used by other local parties. But even given the high quality of the database, the Labour Party will always contact some individuals who are unlikely to offer their support by mistake.

< Insert Figure 1 here >

### *Treatment*

Individuals in the two ‘landline’ telephone treatment groups were called by telephone by Labour Party volunteers<sup>5</sup> in the week leading up to the election (November 10<sup>th</sup> – 15<sup>th</sup> 2012), and were encouraged to vote in the West Midlands Police Commissioner election on November 15<sup>th</sup> 2012. In formulating the GOTV scripts we worked closely with the local Labour Party in order to ensure the messages paralleled normal GOTV efforts. Both messages provided practical information to subjects about the election date and their local polling station and encouraged them to vote for the candidate providing information about his background and his most important policy stance (opposition to cuts in police numbers). However, the content of the scripts did vary across the two ‘landline’ treatment groups. The ‘party affiliation treatment’ message explicitly referred multiple times to the candidate’s party affiliation, while the ‘basic candidate treatment’ message did not mention the candidate’s party affiliation. Both message scripts are displayed below.

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<sup>5</sup>The majority of volunteers were local party activists. In order to reach our target contact rates, some additional student volunteers also participated in the phone bank. We took care to ensure that local and student volunteers administered both the party and the candidate treatments.

**Box 1: Basic GOTV message – No mention of candidate’s party affiliation.**

“Hello, my name is .... I am phoning to remind you to go out and vote for [candidate name] in the Police and Crime Commissioner Election on Thursday. Your local polling station is located at ... during the usual opening hours from 7am to 10pm.

Have you heard of [candidate name]? [Candidate name] is a candidate for Police and Crime Commissioner and he is determined to fight the cuts in frontline policing. As Chair of the West Midlands Police Authority [candidate’s first name] has a strong record in reducing crime and protecting our Police Force. [Candidate name] has been fighting for the victims of crime for over 30 years.

Thanks a lot for taking the time to talk to me.

**Box 2: GOTV message mentioning candidate’s party affiliation.**

“Hello, my name is .... I am phoning from your local Labour Party. I just wanted to remind you to go out and vote for Labour candidate [candidate name] in the Police and Crime Commissioner Election on Thursday. Your local polling station is located at ... during the usual opening hours from 7am to 10pm.

Have you heard of the Labour candidate [candidate name]? Labour’s [candidate name] is determined to fight the Tory cuts to frontline policing that will hit Birmingham hard if a Conservative is elected. The Conservatives have sacked Police Officers and closed down Police Stations. In contrast, the Labour Party put more Police Officers on the ground and will protect police numbers.

Thanks a lot for taking the time to talk to me.

Campaign volunteers were asked to fill out a form on whether contact with the targeted individual was made, any reasons for why contact might have failed (i.e. answering machine, no answer, hang-up, etc.), and the number of call-backs made (see Online Appendix). After the election the local Labour Party provided us with an updated version of the database which included turnout data for the PCC election from the marked electoral register.

### ***Balance Test***

In order to test whether there are any imbalances between treatment and control group, which could indicate a problem with the randomisation procedure, we use randomisation inference to assess whether any imbalances that exist between treatment and control groups are greater than those we would expect to occur from chance alone. We test for balance on a number of important covariates of turnout. We first extract the log-likelihood statistic regressing treatment assignment on the following pre-treatment covariates (using multinomial logistic regression): validated turnout in all available previous elections, electoral ward, gender and age. We use randomisation inference to compare the resulting log-likelihood to the mean of the test-statistics we receive after simulating the random assignment procedure 10,000 times. According to Gerber and Green (2012: 107) “when all possible randomisations have been simulated, the collection of test statistics represents the exact sampling distribution under the null hypothesis that no covariates have any effect on the assigned treatment.” The resulting p-value of .86 indicates that imbalances between treatment and control groups are likely due to chance.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup>There are a small number of individuals in our dataset for which we could not verify whether they voted, as their names were removed from the updated electoral register. These individuals had either passed away or moved to another city. This issue of attrition is common in GOTV studies and is not usually considered a problem because the resulting ‘missingness’ is unlikely to be a function of treatment assignment. To test this assumption, we regressed whether turnout was reported or not on treatment assignment and compared the F-statistic of this regression to the mean of the F-statistic over 10,000 simulated randomisations -- a method proposed by Gerber and Green (2012). The resulting p-value of .59 confirms that attrition is likely to have occurred independently of treatment assignment. Before proceeding to the balance test and the analysis, we removed all individuals from the dataset who could be identified as postal voters based on a pre-treatment measure, as most postal voters would have voted before our GOTV effort and we therefore did not expect the Labour campaign to have any impact on these individuals’ turnout in the PCC election. All reported effects are hence for a population that excludes postal voters.

### ***Contact Rates and One-sided Noncompliance***

The contact rates displayed below in Table 1 include the percentage of those individuals who have been successfully contacted by volunteers, meaning that the caller spoke to the named person and was not asked to "call back later".<sup>7</sup>

Table 1 shows that we need to deal with one-sided noncompliance or failure-to-treat, a common issue in GOTV studies. We failed to administer the treatment to around 60% of those who were assigned to be treated because phone lines were dead, subjects had moved away, or could not be reached on a first or second attempt. Unfortunately, our manpower was not sufficient to call back more than once. This rate of noncompliance is similar to the rate recorded in other Get-Out-the-Vote studies in the UK (John and Brannan 2008). We will return to the issue of non-compliance in the Analysis and Results section.

< **Insert Table 1 here** >

### **Analysis and Results**

We randomly allocated individuals for which only a landline phone number was available into two treatment groups and one control group. This randomisation was done within each of the three partisan blocks – Labour partisans, supporters of rival parties, and individuals for whom

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<sup>7</sup>On the last day of telephone canvassing, volunteers were instructed to leave candidate only/party label messages on answering machines in case subjects could not be reached during the second round of calling. Our CACE estimator assumes that those messages had negligible effects on subjects. If we assume instead that the messages left on answering machines had an effect as large as speaking to subjects in person, the size of the CACE reduces by around one forth since the overall contact rate increases from .40 to .56 (.56 for Labour partisans and supporters of other parties, and .53 for unattached voters).

partisanship is unknown – effectively resulting in a separate experiment for each partisan group, although each with the same rate of assignment to treatment and control groups (.38 and .62).

In Table 2 we show the turnout rates for the candidate advocacy only (‘basic candidate’) and the party affiliation treatment groups and the control group, for each of the three partisan blocks separately, as well as combined (weighted by the number of individuals in each of the three blocks). Turnout in the PCC election among those in the control group who identify either with Labour or another party was 17%. For those whose party attachment is unknown or who the Labour Party listed as non-voters, turnout was, not surprisingly, much lower at only 8%. Turnout in both treatment groups was on average 2-3 percentage-points higher than in the control groups. The only exception is turnout among other party supporters who received the partisan treatment. For this group turnout was similar as to that of the control group at 17%.

< **Insert Table 2 here** >

We now turn to evaluating our hypotheses. We test the hypotheses for each partisan group separately using the differences-in-means estimator, which subtracts the average turnout among individuals in the control group from the average turnout rate among individuals in the relevant treatment group. This will provide us with the so-called intent-to-treat effect (ITT). Formally, we can write this as:

$$ITT_Y = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N (Y_i(z = 1) - Y_i(z = 0))$$

where  $Y_i(z = 1)$  is the potential outcome of those who are assigned to a particular treatment and  $Y_i(z = 0)$  is the potential outcome of those who are assigned to the control group. The ITT effect of both treatment conditions for each partisan group is shown in the top two rows



of Table 3. It can be interpreted as the percentage-point difference between the average turnout in the treatment and control groups. We estimate p-values and confidence intervals using randomisation inference because in comparison to regression analysis, randomisation inference does not make any unrealistic assumptions about the sampling distribution. Following Gerber and Green (2012), we first calculate the differences-in-means in our realised randomisation. In order to see if estimated differences are simply due to sampling variability, we then simulate 10,000 alternative randomisations and compare the differences-in-means estimate that we received from our actual randomisation to the mean estimate over 10,000 simulations. We conduct a one-sided hypothesis test testing the sharp-null hypothesis that the treatment effects are zero for all observations. Since we can actually observe both potential outcomes under the sharp-null, we can calculate the probability of obtaining an estimated ITT “at least as large as the one we obtained from our actual experiment if the treatment effect were in fact zero for every subject “ (Gerber and Green 2012: 62). The confidence interval estimates rely on the assumption that within each block, the treatment effect is the same for each subject (see Gerber and Green 2012: 67).

The table shows that for all three groups turnout increased in the range of 2 to 3 percentage-points as a result of the GOTV message that supported the candidate without mentioning his party affiliation or associating his policy positions with a political party; however, only for those who did not associate themselves with the Labour Party was this increase significant (with a p-value < .10 for rival party supporters and a p-value < .01 for unknown party supporters). To calculate the overall impact of the message that does not include any party label we estimate the ITT effect using differences-in-means and p-values using randomisation inference, across the whole telephone experiment taking into account that

randomisation occurred within partisan blocks. The final column of Table 3 shows this effect to be around 3 percentage-points.

In order to further improve the precision of our estimate of the ITT effect, we include a number of pre-treatment covariates that are likely to explain some of the unobserved variance in turnout. We include covariates for turnout in the previous seven elections, for gender, age and for the electoral ward in which an individual resides. The re-estimated ITT effects are shown in the bottom rows of Table 3. Covariate adjusted, the effect sizes of the basic candidate treatment range from .03 for Labour supporters and .04 for subjects without reported partisan attachments (significant with a p-value of  $< .05$  and  $< .001$  respectively) to .03 for other party supporters (significant with a p-value  $< .05$ ).

Turnout among all the subjects that were assigned to receive the alternative message including references to the candidate's Labour Party affiliation was around 3 percentage-points higher than among those in the control group (2 percentage-points without covariate-adjustment). This difference is significant with a p-value of  $< .01$ . The size of the treatment effect varies by partisan group though. After adjusting for covariates, Labour supporters show a 4 percentage-point and subjects without reported partisan attachments a 3 percentage-point higher rate of turnout (both significant with a p-value  $< .01$ ) than subjects in the control group. We find no substantial or significant increase in turnout among rival party supporters as a result of the party affiliation treatment.

**< Insert Table 3 here >**

The Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effects are conservative estimates of the impact of the GOTV campaign, as we failed to administer the treatment to around 60% of our treatment groups. To take account of this non-compliance, we calculate the Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) for each of the three partisan groups separately. The CACE is the average treatment effect for so-called ‘compliers’ (those who were successfully contacted by the campaign) only. The ITT effect of treatment assignment ( $z$ ) on actually receiving the treatment ( $d$ ) equals the proportion of compliers in the sample.

The CACE estimator can be defined as:

$$\widehat{CACE} = \frac{\widehat{ITT}}{\widehat{ITT}_D}$$

, where

$$\widehat{ITT}_D = \widehat{E}[d_i(1)]$$

We define compliers as those subjects that answered the phone when called by party volunteers. To obtain an estimate of the CACE, we divide the ITT effect by the contact rate. We estimated the CACE for each of the three partisan groups separately by running a two-stage least squares regression of turnout on contact, using treatment assignment as the instrumental variable.<sup>8</sup> The results are shown in Table 4.

As would be expected, the effect sizes of the CACEs are larger than the ITT effects reported in Table 3. For the whole sample we find an increase in turnout of 7 percentage-points

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<sup>8</sup> If  $Y_i$  is turnout,  $D_i$  is contact under either treatment condition (the endogenous variable) and  $Z_{1i}$  is treatment assignment to the party affiliation treatment and  $Z_{2i}$  is treatment assignment to the basic candidate treatment, then the model we estimate can be formally written as:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \tau_3 D_i + \mu_i$$

, in which

$$D_i = \gamma_0 + \tau_1 Z_{1i} + \tau_2 Z_{2i} + \varepsilon_i$$

without covariate adjustment, and of 8 percentage-points with covariate adjustment<sup>9</sup>, as a result of the GOTV message that does not refer to the candidate's Labour Party affiliation and an increase of 5 and 6 percentage-points, respectively, as a result of the message that does. The latter numbers in particular, however, mask substantial differences between the three partisan groups. For Labour partisans and individuals unattached to any party we find a significant increase in turnout of 10 and 8 percentage-points as a result of the campaign that mentions party affiliation, whereas for rival party supporters the increase is only around 1 percentage-point – a statistically insignificant increase.

We can also discuss the effectiveness of the campaign in terms of the number of successful contacts necessary to obtain one additional vote. To mobilize one additional Labour supporter with a message including the candidate's party affiliation requires 10 successful contacts. To mobilize one additional rival party supporter the same message, however, requires as many as 77 successful contacts. To obtain the same result using the baseline message requires 15 successful contacts among Labour, and 16 successful contacts among rival party supporters.<sup>11</sup>

**< Insert Table 4 here >**

Although we find no evidence that messages containing a candidate's party affiliation mobilize supporters of rival parties, the question remains as to whether such messages make rival party supporters less likely to vote than Labour Party supporters who receive a similar message. To answer this question, we model turnout as a function of contact, partisan group and the

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<sup>9</sup> The covariates are included in both estimation equations of the two-stage least squares regression.

<sup>11</sup> The equivalent numbers for unattached voters are 13 and 10 contacts per vote, and for all groups combined 16 and 12 contacts per vote.

interaction between the two, using assignment to the party affiliation treatment as the instrumental variable in a two-stage least squares regression. If  $Y_i$  is turnout,  $D_i$  is contact (the endogenous variable) and  $Z_i$  is treatment assignment to the party affiliation treatment, then the model we estimate can be formally written as:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \tau_4 D_i + \beta_1 Labour_i + \beta_2 Unattached_i + \tau_5 (D * Labour)_i + \tau_6 (D * Unattached)_i + \dots + \mu_i$$

, in which

$$D_i = \gamma_0 + \tau_1 Z_i + \gamma_1 Labour_i + \gamma_2 Unattached_i + \tau_2 (Z * Labour)_i + \tau_3 (Z * Unattached)_i + \dots + \varepsilon_i$$

Both equations include the same set of exogenous covariates. The results of the estimation of this model are shown in Table 5. The reference group reflects the effect of the party affiliation treatment for rival party supporters. The interaction effect (covariate adjusted) between Labour partisans and the treatment shows that Labour partisans are around 8 percentage-points more likely to turn out when treated than supporters of rival parties. The interaction effect is statistically significant with a p-value  $< .05$  using a one-sided hypothesis test. We also find the interaction effect between unattached voters and the treatment to be around 6 percentage-points and statistically significant with a p-value  $< .10$ . Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 3 over Hypothesis 2: Rival party supporters are *less* likely to turn out to vote than Labour supporters in response to a message containing the candidate's party affiliation. Mobilization is therefore likely to be asymmetric when initiated by candidates who emphasize their affiliation to political party.

**< Insert Table 5 here >**

Furthermore, we examine Hypotheses 1 and 4, testing whether messages containing the party affiliation of the candidate were significantly more effective at mobilizing potential voters than the messages without party labels. Table 6 shows the estimates from regressing turnout on a dummy variable indicating whether a subject complied with the party affiliation treatment (coded 1) or with baseline candidate GOTV treatment (coded 0), interacted with partisan group. All estimates are covariate adjusted. Since the treatment groups have been randomly assigned, we can assume the share of compliers to be equal in both treatment groups. Therefore, we can compare the compliers directly to each other, using an OLS regression for estimation. Formally, we can write the OLS model including covariates in which  $Y_i$  is turnout and  $W_i$  indicates that the subject answered the phone when assigned to be contacted with the party affiliation treatment (as opposed to answering the phone when assigned to contact under the baseline treatment) as:

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \tau_1 W_i + \beta_1 Labour_i + \beta_2 Unattached_i + \tau_2 (W * Labour)_i + \tau_3 (W * Unattached)_i + \dots + \varepsilon_i$$

Based on the estimation results presented for all subjects who either received the party affiliation treatment or the candidate baseline treatment in Table 6, our best guess is that employing a message including the candidate's party affiliation versus a similar message without such information reduced turnout by around 4 percentage-points among subjects who support a rival party and by around 2 percentage-points for subjects unattached to a political party, while increasing turnout by around 1 percentage-points among Labour partisans. While substantially interesting, these differences are not statistically significant at conventional levels of significance.

**< Insert Table 6 here >**

A potential reason for why we do not find a statistically significant differential effect of adding party affiliation to the baseline candidate-advocacy GOTV message might be that party affiliation matters more for individuals who are not familiar with the candidates. It has been suggested that information of this kind might have stronger effects among the least informed (Arcenaux and Kolodny 2009). Unfortunately, we do not have any background measure of political knowledge. We therefore use a proxy, namely, how many times an individual voted over the past 7 elections. Voters who are more engaged should be more likely to know parties and candidates even if no extra information is provided to them.<sup>12</sup>

When we restrict our sample to “infrequent voters” in Table 6 – those who voted in 5 or fewer of the past 7 elections - we find that framing a message in Labour terms rather than advocating for a candidate without mentioning his party affiliation does have a significant negative impact on turnout among supporters of rival parties, reducing turnout by 8 percentage-points (see also Figure 2b). Moreover, among infrequent voters, Labour supporters are around 2 percentage-points more likely to turn out when called with message containing the candidate’s party affiliation than when they are called with the candidate message; however, this difference is not different from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. In contrast, the framing of the message does not appear to have any impact on frequent voters (Figure 2c).

**< Insert Figure 2 here >**

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<sup>12</sup> Information recorded by phone bank volunteers shows that frequent voters were around 3 times as likely to mention or ask for the candidate’s party affiliation than infrequent voters when contacted with a message that did not mention any party affiliation. This finding gives us confidence in our proxy.

We therefore find little support for theories that predict that knowledge of a candidate's party affiliation should increase turnout by cutting information costs. Rather, our results suggest that knowing a candidate's party affiliation can lead certain supporters of rival parties, namely those who appear little engaged in politics and are hence dependent on these cues, to dismiss any GOTV efforts directed at them. Moreover, we find no conclusive evidence that GOTV messages that mention a candidate's party affiliation increase turnout among Labour supporters by much more than what we would expect from a basic GOTV message alone.

### **Discussion and Conclusions**

With this randomised field experiment we set out to test competing theories of how explicit party labels in campaigns impact on the turnout decisions of potential voters. On the one hand, such labels might simply provide information, reducing the cost of voting for everyone. On the other hand, they might allow individuals to filter information based on their own partisan preferences, only mobilizing those that are like-minded. By providing new evidence, our study significantly contributes to this theoretical debate.

We find that contact with a campaign that avoids mentioning a candidate's party affiliation was very effective in increasing turnout in the Police and Crime Commissioner Election, and at least as effective as a message that explicitly mentioned the candidate's affiliation several times. However, our results indicate that the effect of both messages depends on an individual's partisan predisposition. Specifically, while we do not find any substantively or statistically significant effects of receiving a message stressing party affiliation on the propensity to turn out for individuals who are expected to vote for a rival political party, we do find significant effects when individuals are contacted with a message that does not mention the



candidate's party affiliation. We can conclude from these results that individuals indeed screen out information that comes from candidates that belong to parties they oppose and that party labels do not always cut information costs, leading to higher turnout. Our results thus largely validate the theoretical expectations formulated by authors who attribute important conditioning effects to partisanship (Zaller 1992; Fiorina 1976).

Moreover, results from our randomised field experiment suggest that Get-Out-The-Vote telephone campaigns as commonly conducted by political parties in local constituencies in the United Kingdom are very effective in mobilizing their target population -- namely those individuals who have previously been identified as likely to vote for the party -- but also in mobilizing unaffiliated voters. Their effectiveness is not principally due to the use of party labels, but to other elements of a GOTV call. The CACE estimates of around 10 percentage-points for Labour partisans and 8 percentage-points for unattached voters are the more impressive considering the low turnout context of the election. Given a turnout rate in the Labour partisan control group of 17.3 percent, a 10 percentage-point turnout increase means that those in the party affiliation treatment group were 58 percent more likely to vote. These impressive results stand in contrast to the null findings reported by a majority of partisan GOTV experiments in the US and observational studies of voter contact by political parties in Britain, but match the effect sizes reported in non-partisan GOTV studies in the UK. John and Brannan (2008) find a significant increase in turnout in the 2005 British General Election as a result of their non-partisan telephone campaign in Manchester. They report an ITT effect of 3.5 and a CACE of 7.3 percentage-points. A second study conducted in the UK, by Fieldhouse et al. (2012) in the 2010 British General Election finds an ITT of 3 percentage points and a CACE of 4 percentage-points, but no increase in turnout in the European election of 2009, as a result of a

nationally-representative non-partisan GOTV telephone campaign. Our results are therefore consistent with the mobilization effects found in two studies of non-partisan telephone mobilization in British General Elections. As the first randomised field experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of political parties' Get-Out-The-Vote campaigns in the United Kingdom, these results are clearly important in a comparative perspective and might update our prior assumptions about the effectiveness of local GOTV campaigns run by political parties.

Finally it must be noted, that while the fact that the West Midlands Police and Crime Commissioner Election was a new election allowed us to test whether or not associating a candidate with a particular political party leads to higher turnout among supporters of different parties, the electoral context raises some questions about the generalizability of some of our findings. In elections in which information is more widely available, the majority of voters would be more familiar with the party affiliation of the major candidates. Thus, it remains an open question whether in those elections, messages that stress qualities other than party affiliation would mobilize everyone at similar rates.

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## Tables and Figures

**Table 1: Contact rates by partisanship, in percentages.**

<b>Partisanship</b>	<b>Treatment</b>	<b>N assigned</b>	<b>N treated</b>	<b>Contact rate</b>
Labour partisanship	Party affiliation treatment	531	226	42.56
	Basic candidate treatment	501	227	45.31
Rival partisanship	Party affiliation treatment	601	279	46.42
	Basic candidate treatment	611	262	42.88
Unattached	Party affiliation treatment	930	310	33.33
	Basic candidate treatment	906	315	34.77
<b>Total</b>		<b>4080</b>	<b>1619</b>	<b>39.68</b>

**This table excludes postal voters and individuals with missing turnout data.**

**Table 2: Percentage Turnout for telephone treatment and control groups, by partisanship.**

	<b>Labour</b>	<b>Rival Party</b>	<b>Unattached</b>	<b>Combined</b>
Party affiliation treatment	19.96	17.30	10.32	14.84
Basic candidate treatment	19.56	19.64	11.37	15.91
Control group	17.30	16.74	8.27	13.01
N Party affiliation treatment	531	601	930	2062
N Basic candidate treatment	501	611	906	2018
N Control	1561	1858	2876	6295

**Table 3: Intent-to-Treat (ITT) effect by partisanship, without and with covariates.**

	<b>Labour</b>	<b>Rival Party</b>	<b>Unattached</b>	<b>Combined</b>
<b>No covariates:</b>				
Party affiliation treatment	.028† [-.011, .065]	.006 [-.028, .040]	.021* [-.000, .042]	.018* [.001, .034]
Basic candidate treatment	.023 [-.015, .061]	.029† [-.005, .064]	.031** [.009, .053]	.028*** [.011, .046]
<b>Covariates:</b>				
Party affiliation treatment	.044** [.008, .080]	.008 [-.028, .034]	.025** [.006, .045]	.025** [.009, .041]
Basic candidate treatment	.033* [-.003, .069]	.028* [-.004, .060]	.037*** [.016, .059]	.034*** [.018, .050]

† p-value < .10; \* p-value < .05; \*\* p-value < .01; \*\*\* p-value < .001 (based on one-tailed test of sharp 0 hypothesis). 95%-confidence intervals in brackets. Note: Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, gender, age and electoral ward.



**Table 4: Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) by partisanship, without and with covariates.**

	<b>Labour</b>	<b>Rival Party</b>	<b>Unattached</b>	<b>Combined</b>
<b>No covariates:</b>				
Party affiliation treatment	.063 <sup>†</sup> [-.027,.153]	.012 [.062,.087]	.061* [.006,.128]	.045** [.002,.088]
Basic candidate treatment	.050 [.037,.137]	.068 <sup>†</sup> [-.015,.150]	.089*** [.024,.154]	.071*** [.026,.116]
<b>Covariates:</b>				
Party affiliation treatment	.096* [.009,.183]	.013 [-.056,.082]	.076*** [.016,.136]	.061*** [.021,.101]
Basic candidate treatment	.066 <sup>†</sup> [.016,.149]	.062 <sup>†</sup> [-.016,.140]	.104*** [.044,.164]	.084*** [.042,.125]

<sup>†</sup> p-value < .10; \* p-value < .05; \*\* p-value < .01; \*\*\* p-value < .001 (based on one-tailed test of sharp 0 hypothesis). 95%-confidence intervals in brackets. Note: Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, gender, age and electoral ward.

**Table 5: Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) for partisan affiliation treatment versus control group interacted with partisanship, without and with covariates.**

	No covariates	Covariates
Party affiliation treatment	.012 (.030)	.017 (.028)
Labour x party affiliation treatment	.050 (.046)	.078* (.043)
Unattached x party affiliation treatment	.049 (.045)	.062† (.041)
N	8357	8357


† p-value < .10; \* p-value < .05; \*\* p-value < .01; \*\*\* p-value < .001 (based on one-tailed t-test). Standard errors in parentheses. Note: Main effects for Labour and Unattached partisanship included in analysis. Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, gender, age and electoral ward.

**Table 6: Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) for partisan affiliation treatment versus baseline candidate advocacy treatment interacted with partisanship, without and with covariates.**


	All subjects		Infrequent voters		Frequent voters	
	No covariates	Covariates	No covariates	Covariates	No covariates	Covariates
Party affiliation treatment	-.037 (.035)	-.039 (.033)	-.070* (.039)	-.078* (.038)	.006 (.062)	.008 (.062)
Labour x Party affiliation treatment	.029 (.052)	.053 (.049)	.082† (.054)	.101* (.053)	-.014 (.103)	-.003 (.103)
Unattached x Party affiliation treatment	.007 (.048)	.023 (.045)	.078† (.049)	.078† (.048)	-.064 (.103)	-.104 (.104)
N	1618		1077		541	

† p-value < .10; \* p-value < .05; \*\* p-value < .01; \*\*\* p-value < .001 (based on one-tailed t-test). Standard errors in parentheses. Note: Infrequent voters are defined as subjects who voted in 5 or less out of the previous 7 elections. Frequent voters are subjects who voted in 6 or 7 out of the previous 7 elections. Main effects for Labour and Unattached partisanship included in analysis. Covariates are turnout in seven previous elections, gender, age and electoral ward.

**Figure 1: Treatment and control groups.**



**Figure 2: Difference in turnout (in percentage-points) resulting from mentioning the candidate’s party affiliation, for all individuals (a), for infrequent voters (b), and for frequent voters (c), by partisanship.**



## Appendix

### 2012 PCC Elections Calling Script

#### Pool 1 Labour centric message

When you make a call tick a box in the “Call Attempted” row. Do not leave an answer phone message unless it is the fifth call and we have not made contact yet. Do not call again if a contact has been made (i.e. the larger Question boxes have been filled in), similarly don't write anything in these boxes unless you make a contact or establish that it is a wrong number.

We have a message that we would like you to deliver. You can do it in a conversational manner but please do try and hit all the talking points in the message.

Please do make sure to mention that [candidate name] is the Labour party candidate. This is to preserve the integrity of this experiment which will greatly help us in the long run.

Message:

“Hello, my name is .... I am phoning from your local Labour Party. I just wanted to remind you to go out and vote for Labour candidate [candidate name] in the Police and Crime Commissioner Election on Thursday. Your local polling station is located at ... during the usual opening hours from 7am to 10pm.

Have you heard of the Labour candidate [candidate name]?

Labour's [candidate name] is determined to fight the Tory cuts to frontline policing that will hit Birmingham hard if a Conservative is elected. The Conservatives have sacked Police Officers and closed down Police Stations. In contrast, the Labour Party put more Police Officers on the ground and will protect police numbers.

- Are you going to vote for a Police Commissioner?
- Which party are you going to support in this election?
- If there was a General Election tomorrow, which party would you support?

Thanks a lot for taking the time to talk to me.

**Voice message:** On the 5<sup>th</sup> attempt leave a voice message with the above content but without the ending questions.

Fill in the boxes 1 to 5 according to the criteria laid out on the next page:

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
----	----	----	----	----

### Filling in Q1-5:

Q1

tells us the status of the call so that we can analyse if and how contact was made. Use the following codes to indicate this status:

1. Conversation with the specific individual i.e. you spoke to them and they didn't ask you to "call back later"
2. Voice message left; do not leave a message unless it is the fifth attempt to contact
3. Wrong number i.e. number is for a different address/family or the specific individual has moved away
4. Number not recognised i.e. line is dead or is a fax/modem line

Q2

tells us whether the message was delivered in full; please use the following codes:

1. Full message delivered
2. Individual ends the conversation before you can deliver the full message and does not ask you to "call back later"; if you are asked to call back later leave all of the question boxes blank and we will call through the list again later
3. Individual has already voted i.e. postal voter

Q3

tells us if the individual is interested in which party [candidate name] represents

1. Individual asks you which party [candidate name] represents
2. Individual knows and mentions that [candidate name] represents Labour

Q4

tells us how the person will vote in the PCC election. Please use the following codes:

<b>L</b>	Labour	<b>B</b>	UKIP / [candidate name]
<b>A</b>	Against Labour	<b>I</b>	Independent / [candidate names]
<b>D</b>	Don't Know	<b>Z</b>	Not voting in PCC elections
<b>X</b>	Won't say	<b>J</b>	Will vote for [candidate name] specifically (rather than just the Labour candidate)
<b>T</b>	Conservative / [candidate name]	<b>O</b>	Will vote against [candidate name] personally (rather than just generally Against Labour [A])
<b>S</b>	Lib Dem / [candidate name]		

Q5

IF the individual mentions that [candidate name] is Labour or asks what party he represents, please finish by asking which party they would support if there was a General Election tomorrow and use the following codes:

<b>L</b>	Labour	<b>A</b>	Against i.e. not Labour
<b>T</b>	Conservative	<b>D</b>	Don't Know
<b>S</b>	Lib Dem	<b>X</b>	Won't Say
<b>G</b>	Green	<b>V</b>	BNP
<b>B</b>	UKIP	<b>Z</b>	Won't vote



**2012 PCC Elections Calling Script**  
Pool 2 [candidate name] centric message

When you make a call tick a box in the “Call Attempted” row. Do not leave an answer phone message unless it is the fifth call and we have not made contact yet. Do not call again if a contact has been made (i.e. the larger Question boxes have been filled in), similarly don’t write anything in these boxes unless you make a contact or establish that it is a wrong number.

We have a message that we would like you to deliver. You can do it in a conversational manner but please do try and hit all the talking points in the message.

Please do NOT mention that [candidate name] is the Labour party candidate unless the contact brings it up or asks you which party he represents. This is to preserve the integrity of this experiment which will greatly help us in the long run.

Message:

“Hello, my name is .... I am phoning to remind you to go out and vote for [candidate name] in the Police and Crime Commissioner Election on Thursday. Your local polling station is located at ... during the usual opening hours from 7am to 10pm. Have you heard of [candidate name]?”

[Candidate name] is a candidate for Police and Crime Commissioner and he is determined to fight the cuts in frontline policing. As Chair of the West Midlands Police Authority [candidate’s first name] has a strong record in reducing crime and protecting our Police Force. [Candidate name] has been fighting for the victims of crime for over 30 years.

Thanks a lot for taking the time to talk to me.

**Voice message:** On the 5<sup>th</sup> attempt leave a voice message with the above content.

Fill in the boxes 1 to 5 according to the criteria laid out on the next page:

Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q5
----	----	----	----	----

### Filling in Q1-5:

Q1

tells us the status of the call so that we can analyse if and how contact was made. Use the following codes to indicate this status:

1. Conversation with the specific individual i.e. you spoke to them and they didn't ask you to "call back later"
2. Voice message left; do not leave a message unless it is the fifth attempt to contact
3. Wrong number i.e. number is for a different address/family or the specific individual has moved away.
4. Number not recognised i.e. line is dead or is a fax/modem line

Q2

tells us whether the message was delivered in full; please use the following codes:

1. Full message delivered.
2. Individual ends the conversation before you can deliver the full message and does not ask you to "call back later"; if you are asked to call back later leave all of the question boxes blank and we will call through the list again later.
3. Individual has already voted i.e. postal voter

Q3

tells us if the individual is interested in which party [candidate name] represents

1. Individual asks you which party [candidate name] represent
2. Individual knows and mentions that [candidate name] represents Labour

Q4

tells us how the person will vote in the PCC election. Please use the following codes:

- J** Will vote for [candidate name] specifically (rather than just the Labour candidate)
- O** Will vote against [candidate name] personally (rather than just generally Against Labour [A])
- L** Labour (generally rather than because of a specific like of [candidate name])
- T** Conservative / [candidate name]
- S** Lib Dem / [candidate name]
- B** UKIP / [candidate name]
- I** Independent / [candidate names]
- Z** Not voting in PCC elections

Q5

IF the individual mentions that [candidate name] is Labour or asks what party he represents, please finish by asking which party they would support if there was a General Election tomorrow and use the following codes:

<b>L</b>	Labour	<b>A</b>	Against i.e. not Labour
<b>T</b>	Conservative	<b>D</b>	Don't Know
<b>S</b>	Lib Dem	<b>X</b>	Won't Say
<b>G</b>	Green	<b>V</b>	BNP
<b>B</b>	UKIP	<b>Z</b>	Won't vote